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Jamaica:

ference in “any and everything not to her
liking in either the North or South of the
continent. ”
Driven by what the author describes as
a “trader” mentality in pursuit of its
“commercial interests,” investments by
U. S. companies grew rapidly throughout
Latin America after 1823. The same was
happening elsewhere as “European im
perialism was reaching new heights
throughout Africa and Asia.” The inevi
table response, as Manley affirms in this
book, was a “general awareness of exploi
tation of national economies” by Third
World leaders:

Struggle in
the Periphery
By Michael Manley
Third World Media, in association with Writers and
Readers Publishing Cooperative Society, London,
259 pp.

Reviewed by Basil K. Bryan
ichael Manley spent eight
years (1972-80) as the Prime
Minister of Jamaica. During
this period, Manley and his
People’s National Party attempted to es
tablish a new Jamaica, based on a
philosophy of Democratic Socialism and a
moral imperative to conquer poverty and
underdevelopment. They did not suc
ceed. The account of what transpired in
Jamaica during Manley’s term of office
provides lessons for a more profound un
destanding of the dilemma faced by Third
World countries as they attempt to pur
sue transformation and development.
The portrait that emerges in this book
is a personal account and a reflection of
events that occurred during Manley’s
tenure as Prime Minister. Manley ex
plains that this book is intended to be both
“a comment upon and a mirror of a dialec
tical process,” and notes that both “Latin
America and the Caribbean today are in
the grip of that process.” What Manley
demonstrates throughout this book is the
reminder that escape from this grip is not
easy, for while some forces are courage
ous enough to attempt change in the so
cial and economic fabric, other opposing
forces continue to defend the status quo.
Manley’s reflections reveal the bitter
but yet unending dilemma of an independ
ent Jamaica struggling to remain afloat
politically and economically in the face of
persistent obstacles coming from the
United States. These reflections tell of
the struggle of a Third World country to
overcome centuries of the impact of colo
nialism; to gain national dignity and re
spect; to protect sovereignty and acquire
economic well-being and sufficiency, even
while wrestling to end domination and
exploitation by foreign forces.
As an important point of departure,
this book takes the reader on a journey
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through a political history. Manley argues
“In all these countries the first energies
that although World War II marked the
were directed towards political independ
beginning of the end of colonialism, and
ence. There was a general awareness of
the emergence of political independence,
exploitation of national economies but the
a legacy of economic, cultural and psycho more urgent psychological impulse re
logical devastation was left behind, giving flected the urge to freedom and the need to
rise to a dependency syndrome. Many
escape degradation. Every new independ
Third World leaders were soon to realize
ence experience was accompanied by ex
that the political freedom won was but one citement and hope. B u t the liberated spirit
small step to total independence. “Each
cannot exist on a diet of freedom alone.
one,” he writes, “was learning that its flag The great imperialisms had left behind
of freedom was only a symbol of new
societies where the majority lived in abys
opportunities and not, by itself, evidence
mal poverty with little education, inade
of real change. ”
quate health services and squalid housing.
Independence had not been won for bread
y attempting to make “real
alone; but bread in the sense of the hope
change” in Jamaican society,
and reality of material betterment, was
Manley must have considered
always the largest part of the equation.
the difficulties ahead, especially Independence had to be followed by mate
in dealing with the United States, his
rial progress for that majority who had
country’s most important trading partner. never known it, indeed could never know
Manley is specific on this point: “Those
it, while part of the colonial experience. ”
who wished to work for change would
Manley shows that up to 1972, when he
have to contend with more than poverty
assumed
the leadership in Jamaica, U. S.
and entrenched oligarchies. . . particularly
if they were located in the Western Hemi interests owned almost all of the island’s
bauxite and alumina industry. He at
sphere.” Meaning, they “would have to
tempted to change this through negotia
contend with American power and the
tions. He explains that, subsequent to the
reality of the most formidable hegemony
imposition of the Bauxite Production
in history. ”
The American plan, Manley notes, was Levy in changing this relationship, his
first outlined by President James Monroe government was subjected to a policy of
in the “Monroe Doctrine” of 1823— in
destabilization, apparently orchestrated
effect, a “hands-off” warning to any Euro by the U. S. But Manley quickly points
pean power entertaining the notion of
out that no “smoking gun” was left in
intervening in the affairs of the nations of
support of this claim. Yet he provides the
the Western Hemisphere. President
reader with examples of similar patterns
Monroe made it clear that the U. S. would emerging in countries attempting the
regard any interference as a threat to its
nationalist route— Mexico, Colombia,
own security and hegemony. Monroe’s
Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, Cuba, Iran
speech, according to Manley, though
under Mossadegh and Chile under Al“largely unnoticed at the time, came to
lende. Given Manley’s attempt at creating
provide the excuse for the assertion of
an egalitarian society, bringing the “com
manding heights” of the economy under
U. S. power in the Americas.” It was
greater public control and accountability,
used, he explains, to justify U.S. inter
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and given the historical position of the
United States on these matters, his as
sertion does not seem far-fetched.
In making the point concerning the destabilization of his government, Manley
uses the example of Chile, where the
attempt by President Allende to bring his
nation’s resources under local control was
met by a similar policy. Manley writes:
“By the time the CIA had finished with
Chile, many citizens and particularly
members of the middle class were hyster
ically convinced that Allende intended to
destroy everything of value in Chile. ”
n Jamaica, the wheels of destabiliza
tion, the book notes, were put in
motion from the time (1974) Manley’s
administration took the decision to
reaffirm its party’s socialist commitment
to the reorganization of the Jamaican soci
ety, with “the politics of participation” as
the basis of a new order. Obviously, he
must have realized that these “radical”
alternatives were in direct juxtaposition to
the usual unaccountability of the free en
terprise system in Third World countries.
This leftward shift, not surprisingly,
brought about economic reprisals by the
U.S., which were manifested by pres
sures from, among other international
sources, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Foreign sources of capital literally
dried up and destabilization created pres
sures and dislocations that were reflected
in constantly rising prices, declining in
comes, rising unemployment, growing
violence and civil disorder. And the wors
ening of an already critical foreign ex
change aggravated the situation.
The net effect, Manley writes: “By the
end of 1975, Jamaica had become like a
time bomb.” Inflation was soaring; crime,
violence and anti-government activities
were taking their toll.
Manley suggests that his government’s
friendly relations towards Cuba and other
socialist bloc countries served only to
heighten suspicions of Jamaica turning
into a communist nation. Disinformation,
abetted by anti-communist propaganda,
became a daily ritual. Many unfavorable
articles appeared in the U.S. media,
creating havoc with the island’s tourist
industry. Manley argues that even Jamai
ca’s influential newspaper, the conserva
tive Daily Gleaner, launched a full-fledged
battle against his government. Through
out the country, on an almost daily basis,
the seeds of doubt were scattered. Condi
tions deteriorated rapidly and destabiliza

tion took its inevitable toll on national
pride as hopelessness and despair over
whelmed the Jamaican people.
Throughout the period 1975-79, condi
tions in Jamaica continued to deteriorate,
with each new day ushering in a
weakened government. Appeals to the
IMF for foreign exchange assistance be
came the logical consequence— a clear
paradox for Manley’s government to have
sought help from this quarter while
recognizing that “IMF agreements simply
miss the point of the Third World di
lemma” and therefore leave the popula
tion “subjected to severe pressure in pur
suit of benefits that are unattainable.”
After a “harrowing” experience with
the IMF Manley was finally driven to
break with that institution and to pursue
an alternative path of self-reliance.
In seeking a new mandate, Manley
points out, his government called for new
elections in 1980. He demonstrates at
length that the campaign leading up to the
elections was bloody and violent. More
than 750 ordinary people (to whom Manley dedicates this book) were killed. Manley asserts that his electoral defeat to the
conservative Jamaica Labour Party,
headed by Edward Seaga, was the result
of a combination of forces working in
opposition, including “some of the most
right-wing elements in the U.S. political
system .”
It is surprising, however, although so
much activity was taking place, Manley is
unable to present any hard evidence to
support his allegations. It would seem
strange that Manley’s party, which won an
overwhelming victory in 1976, could have
lost so much public confidence by 1980.
But again, the economic crisis resulting
from his government’s policies did reach
intolerable proportions and did generate
widespread disillusionment among the
electorate. Given that Manley’s farreaching policies may have been valid
from a nationalistic point of view, in the
end, they contributed much to hamper
Jamaica’s economic growth.
Manley concludes his reflections by
making some useful comments. Having
dissected the events of the past, and
recounted mistakes, he proposes some
solutions for the future of the Third
World. He suggests, for example, “the
necessity for the Third World to evolve its
own path to salvation.” Also, that “ . . . the
antipodes of domination and liberation
cannot coexist; that the ‘pecuniary inter

ests’ of the Monroe Doctrine and Norman
Manley’s [his deceased father who had
served as Chief Minister in an earlier
period] charge of economic selfdetermination cannot live side by side.”
But apart from suggesting a non-aligned
path as a general strategy, the reader is
essentially left to wonder whether Manley is opting for disengagement or to
remain a part of the periphery of the
capitalist system.
United action and solidarity among
Third World nations, Manley observes, is
the only way by which these countries
can hope to achieve economic viability and
true independence. “Collective selfreliance among Third World countries
must become more than a slogan, ” he
argues.
Indeed, it is Manley’s view that closer
unity must become the modus operandi if
Third World nations are to survive in a
world dominated by a few rich countries.
This is a noble plea! Yet the reality
throughout the Third World does not give
much comfort and this solidarity cannot
be achieved by a magic wand. It is this
seeming inability to act in unity that un
derlines Manley’s importance to the Third
World. For he quite correctly recognizes
that the Third World dilemma requires
“common cause in the struggle to create a
new world economic order. ”
hough in the preface Michael Manley notes that this book is neither
“history nor autobiography, ” what
emerges is a mixture of both. In a
broad sense, one cannot separate per
sonal accounting from autobiography, and
history certainly involves telling a story
— which is what Manley does in this
book.
Despite certain difficulties in the appli
cation of some of his ideas, Manley de
serves credit for his work. After all, there
is still a relative paucity of analyses of the
problems and concerns of the Third
World, as told by voices from the Third
World. Indeed, Manley is an eloquent
spokesman in this regard.
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